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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee
on the basis of sex.' The language of Title VII does not specifically
address the issue of whether sexual harassment constitutes sexual discrimina-
tion under the Title. As a result, courts initially dismissed sexual harass-
ment claims for failure to state a claim for relief under Title VII. 2
In 1980, the lack of uniformity and confusion in construing Title VII
prompted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to
develop guidelines for analyzing sexual harassment claims.3 The guidelines
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
2. See Garber v. Saxon Business Prod., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on
procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
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affirmed the position that sexual harassment in the workplace is a violation
of Title VII." According to the guidelines, hostile environment sexual
harassment need not result in denial of employment opportunities.' It is
harassment that creates an "intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment." Although the EEOC Guidelines articulated the concept of
"hostile environment" sexual harassment, because the commission is only
an administrative agency and its promulgations do not carry the weight of
binding law, some courts were unwilling to recognize hostile environment
claims.7 In 1986., the Supreme Court for the first time attempted to put an
end to the confusion when it decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.!
One of the ways the Supreme Court helped ease the debate was by
recognizing that claims of hostile environment sexual harassment were
actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII. 9 The Court further held
that although the EEOC Guidelines are not binding on the courts, they are
a body of experience and informed judgment that courts and litigants should
look to.'0 The Supreme Court set a standard for when hostile environment
sexual harassment is actionable: the conduct must be sufficiently "severe
or pervasive" so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive work environment."
The Supreme Court thought it was ending the controversy in this area;
however, the decision failed to address the disagreement between the circuit
courts in defining hostile environment sexual harassment. The biggest
problem the circuit courts have faced since Meritor has been in defining
precisely what conduct would create a sexually hostile environment. 2 The
Court did not define "severe" or "pervasive." This left lower courts without
a guideline which, in turn, has led to inconsistent results. Some courts have
4. See id. § 1604.11 (a). There are two forms of sexual harassment under the guidelines:
(1) quid pro quo, which is when sexual conduct is made a term or condition of employment;
and (2) hostile environment, which is when the conduct unreasonably interferes with the work
performance or the conduct creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.
Id.
5. Denial of employment opportunities may result in "quid pro quo" sexual harassment.
See id. at § 1604.11 (a)(2).
6. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
7. See Jeffrey A. Gettle, Comment, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman
Standard Is It a Viable Solution?, 31 DuQ. L. REV. 841, 845 (1993).
8. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 67.
12. See Gettle, supra note 7, at 846.
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decided that in light of Meritor, the plaintiff must show that the alleged
conduct caused psychological harm. 3 At the same time, other courts have
held that psychological harm is not a necessary element of the claim.
1 4
On November 9, 1993, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., ("Harris If). 5 By deciding this case, the Supreme Court
was hoping to resolve the issues it left unresolved in 1986. The Court did
not overrule Meritor; rather, it broadly interpreted its prior holding and
decided that the conduct need not cause a tangible psychological injury to
be considered sexual harassment. 16 The Court took the middle ground
between making a mere offensive utterance a valid cause of action and
requiring that victims suffer a nervous breakdown as a requirement for a
cause of action. 7 The petitioner argued in her brief, and the Supreme
Court agreed, that requiring psychological injury is inconsistent with the
prophylactic objectives of Title VII' 8 The Supreme Court stated that to
question whether the conduct "seriously affected plaintiff's psychological
well-being" or "led her to suffer injury" is a needless inquiry that focuses
the factfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title
VII does not require.' 9 The Court was trying to set a standard for lower
courts to follow, but it remains to be seen how this decision will be
interpreted by the lower courts.
This comment will analyze the state of the law before the Supreme
Court's decision and whether Harris II has changed the meaning of hostile
environment sexual harassment. There is concern that the elimination of the
psychological harm element makes it too easy for plaintiffs to prove their
cases.2" The goal of this comment is to determine whether Harris II in
fact, does make hostile environment sexual harassment easier to prove. The
Harris II decision by no means resolved all the questions dealing with
sexual harassment. This comment will analyze the ambiguities left by
13. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040 (1987); and
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982).
14. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
15. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
16. Id. at 370.
17. Id.
18. Petitioner's Brief at 23, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-
1168).
19. Harris 1H, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
20. See Linda Greenhouse, Sex Harassment Easier to Prove, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1993, at Al.
1994] 1891
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Harris II and how one appellate court has dealt with the Supreme Court's
holding. Many issues are unresolved in this area, one being the fairness
or unfairness of the reasonable person standard in evaluating sexual
harassment cases. Although this comment focuses on Harris JJ,22 the pros
and cons of the reasonable person standard and the viability of the
reasonable woman standard will also be discussed. This comment will also
address the issue of whether the Federal government's restriction of speech
in the workplace through Title VII is offensive to the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court should be visiting these two issues in the very near
future.
II. STATE OF THE LAW BEFORE HARRIS
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress passed Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24
Its primary goal was to eliminate employment discrimination. 5 Title VII
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's sex.26 As part
of Title VII, the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was
created to help carry out the law.27 By 1972, although the federal law was
in place, Congress realized that the EEOC was not meeting desired
expectations.
21. See Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
22. The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether a plaintiff needs to show she was
psychologically injured in order to recover for hostile environment sexual harassment. The
Court did not evaluate the reasonable person standard. It reversed the district court's decision
and remanded the case to a factfinder who will apply the rule that it set forth. Harris 11, 114
S. Ct. at 371.
23. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof- or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
24. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 113 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.-
C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
27. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.-
C.A.N. 2391.
1892 Vol. 18
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Due to the ineffectiveness of the EEOC, Congress amended Title VII
by passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.2" Congress realized
that the EEOC had been established in 1964 but that its power was limited
to conciliation.29 It became evident that the EEOC needed to have quasi-
judicial power with the authority to obtain enforcement of its orders.3" The
legislative history of the amendment demonstrates Congress' growing
concern with discrimination against women based on gender and its desire
to put a stop to the problem.3' Congress became concerned that discrimi-
nation against women was being regarded by many as either morally or
physiologically justifiable.3" Trying to change society's view of discrimi-
nation based on gender, Congress announced that "[d]iscrimination against
women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment
practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to
any type of unlawful discrimination."33
By 1980, the EEOC had set up guidelines to help courts determine not
only what conduct constitutes sexual discrimination but, more importantly,
what conduct constitutes sexual harassment.34  The guidelines made
harassment on the basis of sex a violation of Title VII." They went on to
recognize two forms of sexual harassment: "quid pro quo" and "hostile
environment."36  When evaluating a sexual harassment claim, the record
is to be looked at as a whole and a decision is to be made based on the
totality of the circumstances.37
Despite the guidelines, some courts were unwilling to allow hostile
environment claims because administrative agency guidelines do not carry
28. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137.
29. Id. at 2138.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 2139. The persistence of discrimination and its detrimental effects require
a reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in employment. Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 238 at 2141.
33. Id.
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. Quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when submission to unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
is made a term or condition of employment. Id. § 1604.11 (a)(1). Hostile environment sexual
harassment is defined by the guidelines as "conduct hav[ing] the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." Id. § 1604.11 (a)(3). Hostile environment sexual
harassment is the focus of this comment.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993).
1994] 1893
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the weight of binding law. 8  By 1981, courts were still refusing to
recognize sexual harassment that did not affect tangible job benefits.39 In
Bundy v. Jackson,4" the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment as actionable under Title
VII.4' This was a boost for women because they could file their claims
without having to prove the harassment detrimentally affected tangible job
benefits.42 But women still had a long road ahead of them because the
court in Bundy stated that the psychological aspect of the work environment
is a "condition of employment" under Title VII.
43
B. The Supreme Court Steps In: Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson
4
Another five years passed before the Supreme Court decided to step in
and lay the foundation in this new area of the law.4 5 This was the first
time the Supreme Court had taken a stand and held that hostile work
environment is a form of sexual harassment that violates Title VII. 46 The
Court reaffirmed the position that Title VII is not limited to "economic" or
"tangible" discrimination. 47  This decision appeared to be the answer
women were waiting for. However, it left many questions unanswered
which, inevitably, have led to controversy.48 According to the Supreme
Court, for lower courts to find that plaintiffs have stated a claim for sexual
harassment, the harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of employment and must create an abusive working
environment.4 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' remand to the
38. See Gettle, supra note 7, at 845.
39. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
40. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
42. See id. at 945.
43. Id. at 944.
44. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id.
48. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experiences vs. Legal Defini-
tions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 55 (1990).
49. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
Vol. 181894
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district court to dispose of Vinson's hostile environment claim.5" The
district court, like many other courts, had previously decided that since there
was no quid pro quo sexual harassment the claim should fail.5' The
respondent, Mechelle Vinson, brought the action against Meritor Savings
Bank, her employer, and Sidney Taylor, claiming that during the four years
she was employed by the bank Taylor had constantly sexually harassed
her.52 Vinson claimed that after her probationary period as a teller-trainee,
Taylor invited her out to dinner, and during the meal suggested that they go
to a motel to have sexual relations." She refused at first, but because she
feared losing her job she eventually agreed.54 Taylor subsequently made
repeated demands for sexual favors, both during and after business hours.55
Over the next several years, they had intercourse forty or fifty times. 6
Taylor fondled Vinson in front of other employees, followed her into the
women's restroom, exposed himself to her, and on several occasions
forcibly raped her." These activities ceased when she started going with
a steady boyfriend. 58 On the stand, the testimony was the typical "he
said/she said." Taylor contended that Vinson made the accusations because
of a business-.related dispute.59 The district court held that since Vinson's
and Taylor's sexual relationship was voluntary and unrelated to her
continued employment at the bank, there was no actionable sexual
harassment.6°
In reviewing these facts, the Supreme Court decided that the EEOC
Guidelines support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury
can violate Title VII.6 ' The guidelines undercut the district court's holding
because under Title VII the fact that sex-related conduct was voluntary, is
not a valid defense to sexual harassment.62 The gravamen of any sexual
50. Id. at 73.
51. Id. at 57.
52. Id. at 60.
53. Id.
54. Meritor. 477 U.S. at 60.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61.
60. Id at 57. This language indicates the court did not find "quid pro quo" sexual
harassment. But for hostile environment sexual harassment, sexual favors need not be made
a condition of continued employment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)(3) (1993).
61. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
19941 1895
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harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome." 3
The harassment need not be "quid pro quo;" it can be "hostile environment,"
because Title VII "affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."'64 In arriving
at its decision, the Supreme Court relied on Rogers v. EEOC.65 Rogers
recognized a cause of action for discriminatory work environment based on
race under Title VII. 66  The court held that a mere utterance which
engendered offensive feelings in an employee is not enough for a claim
under Title VII. 6' On the other hand, a "working environment so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the worker's emotional
and psychological stability" is actionable.6" Although nowhere in Meritor
does the Court say that plaintiffs must show they were psychologically
damaged, quoting from Rogers created great confusion among the circuit
courts and seemed to set a higher threshold for finding sexual harassment
than under the EEOC Guidelines.69 One scholar has suggested that Meritor
leaves room for much legal sexual harassment, which is what the Court set
out to end."0 The Court failed to define how much conduct is lawful-
from this stems the inconsistency that has pervaded this area.
C. Split in the Circuit Courts
In 1986, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co.,' 2 ("Rabidue 11") based on the Meritor decision. 3 Although
this court purports to follow the Meritor reasoning, it denied relief to a
plaintiff who was subjected to an "extremely vulgar and crude" supervisor
who "customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and on
occasion, directed such obscenities to plaintiff."' 4  In the course of the
supervisor's (Douglas Henry) obscene comments about women, he used
63. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
64. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
65. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id. at 238.
68. Id.
69. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 60.
70. See id. at 61.
71. See id.
72. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
73. Id.
74. Id at 615.
1896 Vol. 18
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words like "cunt," "pussy," and "tits."' 5 On at least one occasion, Mr.
Henry called plaintiff a "fat ass. 76 In addition to this, other male employ-
ees displayed, in their offices and work areas, pictures of nude or partially
clad women, to which plaintiff and other female employees were ex-
posed.77 The court of appeals decided that based on the EEOC Guidelines
and legal precedent, for plaintiff to prevail in a Title VII offensive work
environment sexual harassment action, she had to prove that the work
environment seriously affected her psychological well-being. 7 The court
required psychological harm for a valid cause of action, although neither
Meritor nor the EEOC Guidelines make psychological harm an element of
the claim for relief.
79
The court, in Rabidue II, decided that based on the totality of the
circumstances approach espoused by the guidelines, the lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the work environment before and after plaintiff's introduction
to it must be considered together with the plaintiffs reasonable expectation
when she voluntarily entered the environment." This language makes it
seem as though plaintiff assumed the risk of being harassed based on her
sex when she accepted employment at Osceola Refining Co. By affirming
the status quo in this way, the court legitimized sexual harassment. What
is good for society is good for the workplace; or more aptly, what is good
for the gander is good for the goose."1 Even more disturbing is the district
court's opinion, which was quoted by the appellate court in justification for
its holding:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environ-
ments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes,
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was
not meant to - or can - change this .... Title VII was [not] designed
to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American
workers.8"
After reading this, it seems that Judge Newblatt totally misunderstood Title
75. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., ("Rabidue 1") 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich.
1984), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Rabidue 11, 805 F.2d at 619.
79. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
80. Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 620.
81. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 65.
82. Rabidue 1, 584 F. Supp. at 430; Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 620-21.
18971994]
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VII and its goal. Congress enacted Title VII and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act to change conduct that had become acceptable in a
pervasively male dominated workplace.8 3 Judge Keith, in his dissenting
opinion, stated: "In my view, Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such
behavior and attitudes from poisoning the work environment of classes
protected under the Act." 4 He further stated that women should not be
subjected to environments where their sexual dignity and reasonable
sensibilities are visually, verbally, or physically assaulted as a matter of
prevailing male prerogative.8
5
The kind of attitude espoused by the Rabidue II majority reaffirms the
common belief that it is fine to joke sexually with a woman even if it is
offensive to her because it has become socially acceptable behavior. It must
be remembered that the Supreme Court said in Meritor that the gravamen
of sexual harassment is that the advances were "unwelcome" not whether the
harasser set out to cause harm. 6 It is evident that the Sixth Circuit
misinterpreted Meritor and makes it harder or virtually impossible for
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case for sexual harassment by requiring
an element that is unnecessary. 7 It has been proposed that courts want to
see severe psychological harm because they simply do not believe in hostile
environment sexual harassment claims, although they have been recognized
by the EEOC and the Supreme Court. 8
The Third and Eleventh Circuits also require plaintiffs to show that
they were psychologically injured by the offensive conduct.8 9 In Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs were two female police officers who
claimed they were harassed by their fellow workers and supervisors. 9 In
their working division, women were regularly referred to in an offensive and
obscene manner and plaintiffs were personally addressed in such manner.
There was evidence of pornographic pictures of women in the locker room,
which plaintiffs contend embarrassed, humiliated, and harassed them. 91
The behavior by the male police officers included the showing of a
83. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137.
84. Rabidue 11, 805 F.2d at 626-27 (Keith, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
87. See Rabidue 11, 805 F.2d at 619.
88. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 67-68.
89. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11 th Cir. 1982).
90. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1471.
91. Id. at 1472.
1898 Vol. 1 8
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pornographic movie in a squad room which was also used by the plain-
tiffs.92 Although plaintiffs were emotionally affected, scared, and nervous,
the court held that plaintiffs had to establish that the conduct was severe
enough to affect their psychological stability.93
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee,94 made
psychological harm a question to be considered when deciding whether the
harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment. 9'  The court did not find a Title VII violation, although
Henson's supervisor, Sellgren, subjected her and her female co-worker to
crude and vulgar language, and almost daily inquired into their sexual habits
and proclivities.96
The court in Henson enunciated the elements a plaintiff must prove in
order to successfully claim hostile environment sexual harassment: (1)
plaintiff must belong to a protected group; 97 (2) plaintiff was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment;98 (3) the harassment was based upon sex;99
(4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment;
and (5) employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed
to take action. ' °° The confusion comes into play when courts analyze the
92. Id. at 14-75.
93. Id. at 1482.
94. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
95. Id. at 904.
96. Id. at 901-02. The appellate court reversed the district court's order as to the
hostile work environment claim and remanded for a new trial on the issue. Id. at 901.
97. This requires a simple stipulation that plaintiff is a man or a woman. Id. at 903.
98. The conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that plaintiff did not solicit or incite
it and the plaintiff regarded it as undesirable and offensive. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
99. Plaintiff must show that but for her sex, she would not have been subjected to sexual
harassment. Id. at 904.
100. Id. at 903-05. The issue of imputed liability is not dealt with in this comment
because in Harris, the alleged perpetrator was the president of the company. Nevertheless,
the EEOC Guidelines hold an employer responsible for the acts of its agents and supervisory
personnel with regard to sexual harassment, regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993). The Commission
will examine the employment relationship to determine whether the employee was acting in
either a supervisory or agency capacity. Id.
The Supreme Court in Meritor decided not to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability, but agreed with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles
for guidance in this area. 477 U.S. at 72 (1986). Although the Court did not announce a
rule, it did try to give some guidance to lower courts. For example, it stated that employers
are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors; absence of
notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate the employer from liability; and the mere
19941 1899
11
Gomez: Sexual Harrassment After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. - Is it
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
fourth element-the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment. The Eleventh Circuit, like others, claims that for the
harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to affect a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, it must affect plaintiff psychological-
ly. ' Some courts have departed from this line of reasoning and only
require that plaintiffs show either the harassment interfered with their ability
to perform or significantly affected their psychological well-being or, even
bolder, that the conduct need not affect plaintiffs psychologically. 2
The standard of not requiring proof of tangible psychological harm is
fair because someone's job performance may be impaired without their
suffering a nervous breakdown. This shows the confusion that has led to
many inconsistent results. What plaintiffs must plead and prove depends on
what circuit they are in and not on any set standard. This creates uncertain-
ty and may even deter plaintiffs from filing their claims, which is a great
departure from what Title VII set out to accomplish. 0 3 It was evident that
somewhere along the line the Supreme Court would have to step in again
and try to set a standard for lower courts to follow in hostile environment
sexual harassment claims.
III. HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.
A. Lower Court Decision
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee was following
circuit precedent in 1991 when it decided that Teresa Harris had to show she
had been psychologically damaged in order to show she had been sexually
existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with
employee's failure to invoke the procedure, will not always insulate the employer from
liability. Id. Courts since Meritor are split on whether notice is required. Compare Vance
v. Southern Bel. Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1515 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (holding employer
liable for supervisor's conduct even without notice) with Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,
864 F.2d 881, 902 (Ist Cir. 1988) (holding employer liable if he or she had actual or
constructive notice and failed to take appropriate action).
101. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
102. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). The harasser's conduct is what
must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the condition of employment. Id. at 876.
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 900
F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
1900 Vol. 18
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harassed. °4 The test is whether the harassment is conduct which would
interfere with a hypothetical reasonable individual's work performance and
seriously affect the psychological well-being of that reasonable person under
like circumstances." 5 The court cited Rabidue II to justify its hold-
ing.106 By requiring that plaintiffs be psychologically harmed, the courts
are denying relief when work performance has been affected but plaintiffs
have not suffered a nervous breakdown. This is contrary to Title VII. The
EEOC Guidelines were designed to punish people whose conduct unreason-
ably interferes with another's work performance.'0 7 The district court
found that Forklift's president often insulted Ms. Harris because of her
gender and made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos and that his
inappropriate sexual comments offended her as they would a reasonable
woman.' 8 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the behavior was not so
severe as to be expected to seriously affect her psychological well-be-
ing.' 9 In like manner, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."0
B. Facts
Plaintiff, Teresa Harris, was employed by Forklift Systems as a rental
manager from April 22, 1985 until October 1, 1987."' Charles Hardy
was at all material times president of Forklift. ' 2 Mr. Hardy made plaintiff
the object of a continuing pattern of sex-based derogatory conduct. In the
presence of other employees he would make comments like "you're a
woman, what do you know," "you're a dumb ass woman," "we need a man
as the rental manager," and once in front of employees and a Nissan
representative he said, "lets go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate your
raise."' ,3 Mr. Hardy would ask plaintiff and other female employees, but
not male employees, to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket." 4 He
104. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., ("Harris T') No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991) (following Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986)), afjd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
105. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *6.
106. Id,
107. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3) (1988).
108. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *6.
109. Id.
110. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992).
Ill. Harris1, 1991 WL 487444 at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 12-3.
114. Id.
19941 1901
13
Gomez: Sexual Harrassment After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. - Is it
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
would throw objects on the ground in front of plaintiff and other female
employees and ask them to pick them up, and then make comments about
the female employees' attire."' As a result of Mr. Hardy's behavior,
plaintiff experienced anxiety and emotional upset. She did not want to go
to work, cried frequently, began drinking heavily, and her relationship with
her children became strained." 6 On August 18, 1987, plaintiff met with
Mr. Hardy to complain about his treatment towards her."7 He admitted
making the comments but said they were jokes."' He apologized, and on
his promise that the behavior would cease, plaintiff continued working for
Forklift."9 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hardy continued to humiliate her by
suggesting that plaintiff secured an account for the company by promising
to do sexual favors for a customer.20 He said to her in front of other
employees, "what did you do, promise the guy... some 'bugger' Saturday
night?"''
On Thursday, October 1, 1987, plaintiff collected her paycheck and left
Forklift Systems.'22 Considering all the facts and the way plaintiff felt,
the court still refused to recognize she made a prima facie case for hostile
environment sexual harassment. Although the court called this a close case
and found that Mr. Hardy was a vulgar man who demeaned female
employees at his workplace, the court chose to characterize his conduct as
merely annoying and insensitive and dismissed plaintiffs case.'23
C. Supreme Court Holding
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as "abusive work environment"
sexual harassment, must seriously affect an employee's psychological well-
being or lead the plaintiff to suffer injury.'24 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its holding in Meritor and attempted to expand upon it by setting a
standard. 5 The Court, borrowing from Meritor, said that Title VII is
115. Id at *3.
116. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Harris!, 1991 WL 487444 at *3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5-6.
124. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
125. Id. at 370.
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violated "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment." 26  The standard takes a middle path between making
merely offensive conduct actionable and requiring the conduct to cause
tangible psychological harm.'27 The conduct is measured both objectively
and subjectively. The conduct must objectively create a hostile or offensive
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile and the victim must
subjectively perceive the conditions as such. 2' The petitioner argued in
her brief, and the Court seemed by its holding to have agreed, that neither
the language of Title VII nor its legislative history requires proof of serious
psychological injury.129 The decision undercut the Sixth Circuit and
others that require tangible psychological harm because the Court announced
that "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown." 3 ' Justice O'Connor, who rendered the unanimous
opinion, reasoned that psychological harm should not be an element of the
claim for relief because a discriminatorily abusive work environment, even
one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can
and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their
careers.' Such behavior is offensive to the goals of Title VII.
The Court further tried to ease the confusion by stating that the fact
that Meritor made reference to environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to completely destroy the emotional and psychological
stability of employees, merely showed an especially egregious example of
harassment.'33 This language was not meant to mark the boundary for
what is actionable.'34 This seems to be the language circuits were relying
upon to require tangible psychological damage as part of the claim for relief.
As correctly stated by petitioner in her brief, the Sixth Circuit test is based
on a misinterpretation of Meritor.35 Lower courts must now follow the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The appropriateness of the reasonable person standard was not an issue before
this Court.
129. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at 15.
130. Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
131. Id. at 371.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at 20.
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rule that as long as the environment would reasonably be perceived and is
perceived as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologi-
cally injurious.' This decision seems to be a major coup for women who
were kept from showing they were sexually harassed because they had not
endured a nervous breakdown. Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that this
is a difficult area of the law and that there cannot be a mathematically
precise test to determine when there has been a hostile environment sexual
harassment violation under Title VII. 13' This language shows that hostile
environment sexual harassment is far from being a defined area of the law.
The decisions will still vary because juries must look at the totality of the
circumstances and make decisions on a case-by-case basis.' Lower
courts should look at the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its
severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance, and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance. Whether or not the plaintiff suffered
psychological harm may be relevant when determining if in fact plaintiff
found the environment to be abusive, but no single factor is determina-
tive.' In light of its holding, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
and remanded the case because the district court's application of the
incorrect standard may have influenced its ultimate conclusion. 40  The
Court was further inclined to render this decision because the district judge
himself found this to be a close case.' 4' This does not mean that Ms.
Harris won, but at least her case should now be evaluated under the correct
legal standard, giving her a fair chance to prove she was sexually harassed.
IV. IMPACT
The impact the Supreme Court decision will have on Teresa Harris
depends on how the district court weighs all the evidence. This could very
well mean that the district court again finds she was not sexually harassed.
What the court cannot do is ask that she show psychological harm as a
result of Mr. Hardy's abusive behavior. The Supreme Court was not sure
if, or to what extent, the district court relied on the psychological harm
136. See Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id
140. Id.
141. Harris !!, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
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element when it decided that Ms. Harris did not state a claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment.' 42  Therefore, the decision the district
court will make will depend on whether or not it gave too much weight to
this element.
It seems from reading the district court opinion that the court accorded
great weight to the fact she could not show a tangible injury. 43 The court
did find that Hardy was vulgar and treated female employees in a demean-
ing fashion. 4" Further, the court even said that she was offended as
would any reasonable woman.' 4' This shows the court did not find Ms.
Harris to be an especially fragile or sensitive person who was merely
overreacting. In light of all the evidence and the fact that the court cannot
exclusively rely on psychological harm, there is a good chance the court will
change its prior judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim.
Of course, there exists the possibility, as respondent argued to the
Supreme Court in his brief, that the district court did not give any particular
emphasis to the psychological harm element. 46 If this is so, then Teresa
Harris stands to lose again. The Supreme Court was not attempting to cure
all the evils that pervade sexual harassment when it decided Harris II, but
it was a move in the right direction.
The Supreme Court's decision is strong legal precedent for new
plaintiffs who can now successfully argue that they need not show they were
psychologically injured to state a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment. On December 3, 1993, less than a month after the Supreme
Court had decided the sexual harassment issue, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided a case based on Harris Il' 47 The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in
favor of AT&T because it found insufficient evidence to establish hostile
environment sexual harassment. 48 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 19
Although the plaintiff in that case did not make out a claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment, it is important to note that the court
142. Id.
143. See Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444.
144. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *5.
145. Id. at *7.
146. Respondent's Brief at 12, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No.
92-1168).
147. See Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
148. Id. at 531.
149. Id. at 537.
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followed the Supreme Court's decision and stated that psychological injury
is not a necessary element. 5 ' The court further stated that, even without
regard to the tangible effects, the very fact that there was discriminatory
conduct, which was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environ-
ment abusive to employees because of gender, offends Title VII's broad rule
of workplace equality. 1 ' The effect Harris II had on this case was that
the court had to take notice and realize that it could no longer require
plaintiffs to show they suffered anxiety and debilitation as it had in the
past.' Furthermore, this decision shows that Meritor is still alive and
well in this field, as the court relies on it for the basic elements that must
be proven to show hostile environment sexual harassment."13
As was evident with Meritor, lower courts do not always interpret
cases correctly and sometimes the Supreme Court does not convey the
message clearly. It still remains to be seen if lower courts are going to
interpret Harris II properly or are going to read something into it that is not
there. The Saxton decision is only one, and may not be the best, example
to measure how other lower courts will apply the hostile environment sexual
harassment test enunciated by Harris H because the facts are not the ones
commonly found in these types of cases.
The conduct by the supervisor in Saxton was inappropriate but not
severe or pervasive enough as to create a hostile work environment because
the behavior was limited to two instances and he stopped after she made her
lack of interest clear.'54 Saxton and her supervisor, Richardson, met for
drinks after work at Richardson's suggestion.' She had been trying to
meet with him in order to discuss her dissatisfaction with her lab assign-
ment. 56 After spending two hours at a nightclub, they drove to a jazz
club, again at Richardson's request.'57 While they were at the jazz club,
Richardson placed his hand on Saxton's leg above the knee several times
and once he rubbed his hand along her upper thigh.' 8 Saxton removed
his hand each time and told him to stop.' When they left the jazz club,
Richardson pulled Saxton into a doorway and kissed her for two or three
150. Id. at 533.
151. Id.
152. See Saxton, 10 F.3d at 533.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 534-35.
155. Id. at 528.
156. Id.
157. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 528.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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seconds until she pushed him away. 6 ' Saxton repeated her admonition
at work the following morning, and he apologized and assured her that it
would not happen again.' 6 '
About three weeks later, Richardson invited Saxton to lunch to discuss
work related matters.'62 As Richardson was driving her back to her car
after lunch, he took a detour, stopped the car and got out for a walk.'63
Saxton decided to do the same and walked off on her own, when he
suddenly lurched at her from behind some bushes, as if to grab her.'"
She dashed several feet away to avoid him and again told him his behavior
was inappropriate.'65 This was the last time he made any advances toward
Saxton. 66 These facts make the case easier to decide than Meritor or
Harris II, in which the conduct was obviously persistent and abusive. The
ultimate result of Harris II is that plaintiffs who find themselves in courts
that follow the Sixth Circuit test can now cite Harris IIto overrule the need
for psychological harm and remove the burden of proving any unnecessary
elements.
As an interesting alternative, professor Kathryn Abrams has proposed
two ways to prevent sexual harassment without the need to resort to
litigation.'67 The first is for the EEOC to enforce the guidelines which
provide an avenue for reform that is less adversarial than a full-blown
private action.6s The second is for employers to voluntarily implement
programs to train employees on sexual harassment.'69 This alternative is
more desirable because neither the decree nor the litigation will help
employers or employees understand what conduct caused the injury, nor do
they learn more acceptable forms of conduct.' 0 When courts decide
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 528.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 529.
167. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1216-19 (1989).
168. Id. at 1216-17.
169. Id. at 1217. Under this model, the employers would create guidelines indicating
what conduct is proper and which is not proper for the workplace. Id. at 1218. Upon
imposing the guidelines, the employer must impress upon the employees that sexual
harassment in the workplace will not be tolerated and corrective measures will be taken. See
id.
170. Abrams, supra note 167, at 1219.
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sexual harassment they confine themselves to rendering the decision, not to
advising the employer or employees on how they should reform their
conduct. It seems that even if plaintiffs make it to court, the judicial
decrees will do little in improving that particular workplace and preventing
the event from recurring, unless employers get actively involved.
V. FUTURE CONCERNS
A. Psychological Harm Element
The Supreme Court in Harris II was attempting to set a standard that
would erase the confusion that was troubling lower courts. The Court said
that plaintiffs need not show they were psychologically injured in order to
state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.' This was the
standard enunciated by the Court, but there is no set definition. There still
exists no precise test to determine when someone has been the victim of
hostile environment sexual harassment. Harris II leaves us with no set
number of times the harasser must act; all that is evident is that it must be
more than once. Even after the Supreme Court attempted to clear the air,
there is no definition for how "severe" or "pervasive" the behavior must
be.'72  These are important items because they are vital to a correct
judicial decision. It is likely that lower courts are still going to encounter
problems when trying to apply Harris II. This will be especially true in
cases where the conduct was borderline. When the conduct is clear-cut one
way or the other, the court's decision is simplified. Unfortunately, in most
cases, the decision is not so simple because the conduct was neither
extremely blatant nor was it a mere one time occurrence. It then becomes
important what definition is applied and how much weight the elements are
given. It seems that these types of questions are always going to pervade
this area because of the Court's reluctance to set a test and its desire to
leave it up to lower courts to handle on a case-by-case basis.'73
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia points out that the Harris II
holding leaves lower courts unguided because there is no mention of how
much of each factor is necessary nor is a single factor identified as
determninative." 4 This does not help ease the uncertainty that already
171. Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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riddles this area of the law. Justice Scalia concurred because he did not
foresee at the time an alternative course other than the one taken by the
Court. 175  It seems the Court took the better approach, not the best
possible solution. He said that in an attempt to set a definite test, the Court
could rely on the factor of unreasonable interference with the employee's
work performance as the absolute test.'76 This would lend some guidance
to lower courts, but by the same token he pointed out that Title VII's
language does not give any indication that such limitation is appropriate."7
Therefore, it seems the answer to what constitutes hostile environment
sexual harassment is far from being fully answered.
A major concern after Harris II is that removing the psychological
harm element will make hostile environment sexual harassment claims easier
to prove. In other words, it will make it too easy for plaintiffs to show they
were harassed.' 8 However, the author submits that Harris II does not
make sexual harassment easier to prove. The Court simply removed an
unnecessary obstacle. Lower courts were requiring this element based on
a misinterpretation of precedent and aggrieved plaintiffs were the ones
paying the price. Under the new standard, the insurmountable obstacles
have been removed which makes it more fair to plaintiffs. 9 Under the
old standard, women who showed appalling behavior by co-workers and
superiors had their cases dismissed nonetheless, for failure to show tangible
psychological harm.' ° Plaintiffs can now prove the essential elements of
the claim without the need for unnecessary obstacles. Plaintiffs must show
that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough that it created a hostile
work environment in which an objective reasonable person would be
offended.' This is already a difficult task in and of itself without adding
to it unnecessary elements.
The elements of the claim will eliminate any frivolous claims.
Plaintiffs still have to make out a prima facie case. This diminishes the
chance that removing the requirement of showing psychological harm will
open the floodgates of litigation in this area. The judicial system cannot
175. Id.
176. Harris If, 114 S. Ct. at 372.
177. Id. Justice Ginsburg took a position similar to Justice Scalia's by stating that "the
adjudicator's inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance." Id. (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring).
178. See Greenhouse, supra note 20, at Al.
179. See Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
180. See, e.g., Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 611.
181. Harris 1R" 114 S. Ct. at 370.
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create unreasonable obstacles for legitimate claims in an effort to keep out
illegitimate ones. The positive aspect is that now plaintiffs with legitimate
claims will not be discouraged from filing their cases; this is exactly what
must occur if Title VII is to have any effect on preventing hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.
B. The Reasonable Person Standard
The objective reasonable person standard is the standard that has been
used by most courts, and was the one applied by the district court to
determine if in fact Teresa Harris was offended by the conduct of Mr.
Hardy.'82 The conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an
objective hostile or abusive work environment--one in which a reasonable
person would be offended.'83 This is the so-called "sex blind" reasonable
person standard. The standard does not take into account the gender of the
person who was offended. This standard is the one most widely used by
judges and juries to determine if parties to a case acted reasonably.'84
The problem in this area of the law is that consistently women are the
plaintiffs and their perspective is not taken into account.'85 Men have
reported experiences with sexual harassment from women, but historically
it has been more common for women to face this behavior in the work-
place. "'86 "[M]uch of the behavior that women find offensive is behavior
that is accepted as normal heterosexual behavior by men."'87 If courts are
not willing to take into account that a plaintiff was offended because she is
a woman, then sexually harassing environments will remain unchanged
because men in male-dominated workplaces find such behavior normal and
acceptable.'88 It has been proposed that "the reasonable person standard
may even work against Title VII's goal of placing women on an equal
footing with men in the workplace."' 89 Some courts have been willing to
reexamine the reasonable person standard and consequently have decided
182. Id. at 369-70.
183. Id. at 370.
184. See Elizabeth A. Glidden, Note, The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in
Combating Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1825, 1827-28 (1992).
185. See generally Pollack, supra note 48.
186. LILLIAN GLASS, PH.D., HE SAYS, SHE SAYS 208 (1992).
187. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 52.
188. See Glidden, supra note 184, at 1849.
189. See id. at 1839.
Vol. 1 81910
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/10
Gomez
that it was time for a change.'9
In Ellison v. Brady,'9' the Ninth Circuit decided it would evaluate the
severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment from the perspective of the
victim.192 The court chose to take this innovative route because "[h]aras-
sers could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no reme-
dy. 193 Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, tend to view sexual
conduct without understanding the social setting or underlying threat of
violence perceived by women.'94 The court stated that taking into account
the reasonable woman's view does not establish a higher level of protection
for women than men.'95 A gender-conscious examination enables women
to be equal to men in the workplace by acknowledging the effects of sexual
harassment on a reasonable woman.' This standard will protect employ-
ers from the hypersensitive female employee because it considers only the
view of a reasonable woman.'97
The district and appellate courts judged Teresa Harris based on the
perspective of a reasonable sexless person.' This was the same standard
used by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue II, which was the precedent the Harris
I court used.' 99 Interestingly, in Rabidue II, Judge Keith espoused in his
dissent the reasonable woman standard2 °0 five years before Ellison was
decided.20 ' He dissented from the majority because he felt that unless a
woman's view was taken, sexual harassment would continue.20 2 Hopefully
190. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3rd Cir. 1990). The discrimination must "detrimen-
tally affect a reasonable person of the same sex" in the position of the plaintiff. Id. at 1482.
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at
626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (indicating that women and men are different and the standard
should account for this), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
191. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
192. Id. at 878.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 879.
195. Id.
196. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
197. Id.
198. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444.
199. Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 611.
200. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). "[U]nless the outlook of the reasonable woman
is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men." Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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someday soon, the voice of the minority will become that of the majority.
At the moment, the reasonable woman/reasonable victim standard remains
a minority view. As this area of the law has evolved, it has become evident
that men's and women's perspectives must be considered separately.2 3
The First Circuit, also taking the minority position, made the common
illustration that a male supervisor may believe it is perfectly correct for him
to tell a female subordinate that she has a great figure or nice legs.2 4 The
female may find the comments are not a compliment but offensive
behavior.20 5 The problem is that most men are not aware of how seem-
ingly innocent words, "labels," and terms of endearment may be perceived
as sexist; they simply deem them as a way of interacting.20 6 That is why
if the woman's perspective is not taken into consideration, the comments
will be dismissed as nothing more than a man complimenting a pretty wom-
an. 07 This is so regardless of the fact that the female was truly offended
and these types of sexual comments made her feel inferior and uncomfort-
able. More and more women have grown to resent this sort of behavior as
disrespectful and sexist.2°  This is the sort of behavior Title V11 209 was
designed to prevent and it will continue to surface under the current
reasonable person standard.210
The Supreme Court in Harris II did not consider whether or not it
should change the standard to account for the victim's views.2 1' The
Court only dealt with the issue at hand. t2 Perhaps if Teresa Harris would
have had the benefit of being judged based on a reasonable woman's
203. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
204. Id.
205. Id; see also GLASS, supra note 186, at 210. Many may fail to see the reason
women get upset by being called "honey" or "sweetheart" in the workplace. This stems from
the socially acceptable view that the man is just being friendly. Dr. Glass suggests that terms
of endearment have no place in the workplace because they can easily be misinterpreted as
a sexist comment. Id.
206. GLASS, supra note 186, at 211.
207. Id.
208. In a 1984 study conducted by Newsweek, women were asked if it bothered them
when men referred to them as "girls." Only 34% of the women surveyed reported that they
were annoyed, while 51% said it did not bother them at all. This changed six years later
when in 1990, another survey conducted for Virginia Slims American Women's Poll revealed
that 53% of the women were annoyed (a 19% increase), while 44% were not. Id.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
210. Id.
211. Harris !!, 114 S. Ct. at 368.
212. Id. at 371.
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perspective, she would have prevailed. 13 Even the district judge had to
admit that a reasonable woman would have been offended by the behavior
to which Ms. Harris was exposed.214
The viability of the reasonable woman standard has become a burning
issue, one the Supreme Court will not be able to ignore much longer. As
illustrated above, some lower courts have applied Harris II and have shown
the importance of the change. Realistically, it does not matter how severe
or pervasive the conduct was or whether plaintiffs must show tangible
psychological injury if their viewpoint and feelings are not going to be
accorded the weight they deserve by the court.
C. The First-Amendment
Another major concern which the Supreme Court has not addressed is
whether the federal government is unconstitutionally restricting speech in the
workplace through Title VII. The question that begs to be answered is
whether the Court's recent interpretation of Title VII and the expansion of
hostile environment sexual harassment claims is consistent with the First
Amendment." 5 Professor Kingsley Browne suggests that the definition
given to "hostile work environment" is too broad and for it to be consistent
with the First Amendment it needs to be narrowed.1 6 Some speech may
be regulated on the basis of content if it falls within a recognized exception
to the First Amendment such as defamation, obscenity, or fighting
words. 2 7 Traditionally, if the category of speech does not fall under one
of the recognized exceptions, it is protected.
The First Amendment has been invoked successfully to protect
expression even if it is offensive, harmful, or disagreeable to society.2"8
213. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *7.
214. Id.
215. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 484. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). There is no constitutional value in false statements. Id. at
340. Obscene materials have no First Amendment protection. Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23 (1973). Fighting words-those which inflict injury or incite breach of peace-are not
protected by the First Amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571
(1942).
218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The expression of ideas may not be
prohibited simply because society finds it offensive or disagreeable. An exception to this
principle has not been recognized even when our flag is involved. Id. at 414. "IT]he mere
presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify
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The Supreme Court stated in Pickering v. Board of Education,t 9 that the
"core value" of the First Amendment is "having free and unhindered debate
on matters of public importance.""22 This principle seems to be in direct
collision with the cases that have made hostile environment sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII because the person is held liable for
what he says.22" ' This conflict is also evident in racial discrimination
claims under Title VII.2 22 The Sixth Circuit said:
[T]he law does require that an employer take prompt action to prevent
• . . bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or
offends their co-workers. By informing people that the expression of
racist or sexist attitudes in public is unacceptable, people may eventually
learn that such views are undesirable in private, as well.22
This shows that courts are willing to restrict what people say in the
workplace.
It can be inferred from the case law that the workplace is sufficiently
different from the street or a social setting to merit a greater degree of
regulation, but courts have never explained the reason for this.224 Harris
curtailing all speech capable of giving offense." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971). Free speech in our system of government best serves its purpose "when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger." Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Public expression of ideas
will not be prohibited merely because ideas are offensive to some listeners when they can
simply "avert" their ears. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 916 (1978).
219. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
220. ld at 573.
221. E.g., Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 367.
222. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1110 (1989).
223. Id. at 350.
224. See e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
"[M]ost complaints of sexual harassment are based on actions which, although they may be
permissible in some settings, are inappropriate in the workplace." Id. at 1561 n. 13. See Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking the university's
policy prohibiting harassment of students on First Amendment grounds, but suggesting that
"speech which creates a hostile or abusive working environment on the basis of race or sex"
is unprotected); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d
1094 (2d Cir. 1986). Courts do not interfere with what people say or do in their homes or
at social gatherings, but the workplace is different. Id. at 528. See also Robert Post, Free
Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment: Racist Speech, Democracy and the
First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991). Speech in the workplace does not
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II did not answer this question. The Court placed the case outside the
parameters of the First Amendment by stating: "This standard ... takes a
middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive
and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. 225
This is the manner in which the First Amendment issue was disposed of by
the Supreme Court. Since the Court refused to allow claims for sexual
harassment based on a mere offensive utterance, the holding is not
inconsistent with the First Amendment.226 This suggests that the conduct
displayed by Mr. Hardy against Ms. Harris and other female employees was
more than just an offensive utterance within the meaning of the First
Amendment. It was behavior that created an abusive and hostile working
environment, undeserving of First Amendment protection.227
Professor Browne notes that the First Amendment is seldom invoked
in these cases, although the defendant is held liable for expressing social and
political ideas.228 Professor Browne suggests that if the First Amendment
is going to be respected, hostile environment claims cannot be based even
partly on protected speech.229 This would mean that a person who brings
a claim based on employer's (or its agent's) inappropriate touching coupled
with posting of pornographic pin-ups on the walls should not be permitted
to introduce the latter into evidence.23 The problem with this proposition
is that to force plaintiffs to base their claims solely on the physical act
would go against the many judicial decisions on sexual harassment that do
not require touching for a successful claim."' The bulk of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims are based on verbal abuse. This demon-
strates the tension between hostile environment claims and the First
generally constitute public discourse because that sort of dialogue would be patently out of
place. Id. at 289.
225. Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 370; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (supporting the
position that a mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee is not sufficient to implicate Title VII).
226. See id.
227. See Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 367.
228. See generally Browne, supra note 215.
229. Id. at 544.
230. Id.
231. E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs must show they
were subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Id. at 875. See also
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(plaintiff was subjected in the workplace to "pictures of women in various stages of undress
and in sexually suggestive or submissive poses, as well as remarks by male employees and
supervisors which demean women").
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Amendment.
Due to the great public importance of the First Amendment issue, it is
likely that the Supreme Court will be confronted with this issue in the near
future. The Court will have to balance all the interests involved. Employ-
ees have the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult232 and employers likewise have the right
to have their workplaces free from this counterproductive behavior. On the
other hand, citizens have the protection of the First Amendment to give their
opinion on matters of pubic concern. Because the First Amendment is
highly valued, this is not going to be an easy decision for the Court, but
Congress has made clear its desire to stop discrimination in the work-
place.233 The author submits that a solution would be for the Court to
make expressions in the workplace which are targeted at a specific person
and are perceived by that person as offensive an exception to First
Amendment protection. If the Court does not resolve this conflict in favor
of sexual harassment, then the legislative and judicial efforts to stop sexual
harassment have been in vain. The harassment will continue and with more
frequency because the harassers will be clothed by the First Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Harris II seems to be the panacea victims of harassment were waiting
for. Unfortunately, the questions have not been fully answered; if anything,
more questions have been raised. Justice O'Connor said that the Court need
not answer in its opinion all the questions raised by the hostile environment
sexual harassment test.234 This shows that the decision is not going to
solve all present inconsistencies and that sometime soon the Court will be
revisiting the issue. Although the potential remains for a myriad of
questions, the Court did take a positive stand in the struggle to give some
definition to hostile environment sexual harassment claims. Now, plaintiffs
like Teresa Harris will not have to endure a nervous breakdown before they
can prove they were sexually harassed. The Court was not trying to make
sexual harassment easier to prove. It was trying to determine the pertinent
elements of the claim for relief. To do this it reaffirmed Meritor and said
232. Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)).
233. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
234. Harris 1!, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
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psychological harm was never meant to be an element.235 The Court is
merely giving sexual harassment victims what was theirs in the first place:
the chance to show that abusive behavior created a hostile working
environment.
Litigation is not the best means of preventing sexual harassment. The
EEOC Guidelines seek prevention of sexual harassment as a means of
elimination.236 When litigation ensues it is an after-the-fact event geared
towards redress of the victim. The sexual harassment has already occurred
and plaintiff is obligated to relive what happened by recounting the story in
court. Professor Kathryn Abrams' suggestions on preventing sexual
harassment without litigation are a viable solution to the current problem
and merit consideration.23 The battle for preventing sexual harassment
is not only in the hands of Congress and the judicial system, but more
appropriately, at the root of the problem, the workplace.
These suggestions only illustrate ways sexual harassment can be
prevented without resorting to the courts. When preventive measures are
not in place or they do not function, plaintiffs must turn to the judicial
system for redress. They can expect to find inconsistencies in the courts,
because this is a highly uncertain area. There is no set test, even consider-
ing the Courts efforts in Harris II. The propositions set forth in Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg's concurring opinions do not lend any help at the
moment.23 Perhaps when the Court revisits the issue it will look to the
concurring opinions as an aid to reaching a defined test for hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. Until the Supreme Court takes up
the issue again, let us hope lower courts have enough sense to evaluate all
the factors fairly based on the totality of the circumstances, without adding
any unnecessary burdens, from the perspective of the reasonable victim and
not a sexless reasonable person.
Mary C. Gomez
235. Id. at 370-71.
236. 29 C.FR. § 1604.11(f) (1993).
237. Abrams, supra note 167-70 and accompanying text.
238. Harris I, 114 S. Ct. at 371-72 (Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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